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Working Memory Underpins Cognitive Development, Learning, 
and Education
Nelson Cowan
University of Missouri
Abstract
Working memory is the retention of a small amount of information in a readily accessible form. It 
facilitates planning, comprehension, reasoning, and problem-solving. I examine the historical 
roots and conceptual development of the concept and the theoretical and practical implications of 
current debates about working memory mechanisms. Then I explore the nature of cognitive 
developmental improvements in working memory, the role of working memory in learning, and 
some potential implications of working memory and its development for the education of children 
and adults. The use of working memory is quite ubiquitous in human thought, but the best way to 
improve education using what we know about working memory is still controversial. I hope to 
provide some directions for research and educational practice.
What is Working Memory? An Introduction and Review
Working memory is the small amount of information that can be held in mind and used in 
the execution of cognitive tasks, in contrast with long-term memory, the vast amount of 
information saved in one’s life. Working memory is one of the most widely-used terms in 
psychology. It has often been connected or related to intelligence, information processing, 
executive function, comprehension, problem-solving, and learning, in people ranging from 
infancy to old age and in all sorts of animals. This concept is so omnipresent in the field that 
it requires careful examination both historically and in terms of definition, to establish its 
key characteristics and boundaries. By weaving together history, a little philosophy, and 
empirical work in psychology, in this opening section I hope to paint a clear picture of the 
concept of working memory. In subsequent sections, implications of working memory for 
cognitive development, learning, and education will be discussed in turn, though for these 
broad areas it is only feasible to touch on certain examples.
Some researchers emphasize the possibility of training working memory to improve learning 
and education. In this chapter, I take the complementary view that we must learn how to 
adjust the materials to facilitate learning and education with the working memory abilities 
that the learner has. Organizing knowledge, for example, reduces one’s memory load 
because the parts don’t have to be held in mind independently.
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Take, for example, the possibility of doing some scouting ahead so that you will know what 
this article is about, making your task of reading easier. If you tried to read through the 
headings of this article, you might have trouble remembering them (placing them all in 
working memory) so as to anticipate how they fit together. If you read Figure 1, though, it is 
an attempt to help you organize the information. If it helps you associate the ideas to one 
another to build a coherent framework, it should help you read by reducing the working-
memory load you experience while reading. In doing so, you are building a rich structure to 
associate the headings with one another in long-term memory (e.g., Ericsson & Kintsch, 
1995), which reduces the number of ideas that would have to be held independently in 
working memory in order to remember the organization.
Early History of Working Memory Research
In 1690, John Locke distinguished between contemplation, or holding an idea in mind, and 
memory, or the power to revive an idea after it has disappeared from the mind (Logie, 
1996). The holding in mind is limited to a few concepts at once and reflects what is now 
called working memory, as opposed to the possibly unlimited store of knowledge from a 
lifetime that is now called long-term memory. Working memory can be defined as the small 
amount of information that can be held in an especially accessible state and used in 
cognitive tasks.
Philosophers have long been interested in the limits of what can be contemplated, as noted 
by a leading British economist and logician, William Stanley Jevons. In an article in Science 
in 1871, he mused (p. 281): “It is well known that the mind is unable through the eye to 
estimate any large number of objects without counting them successively. A small number, 
for instance three or four, it can certainly comprehend and count by an instantaneous and 
apparently single act of mental attention.” Then he devised a little experiment to test this 
hypothesis, on himself. On each trial, he casually reached into a jar full of beans, threw 
several beans onto a table, and tried to estimate their number without counting. After 1,027 
trials, he made no errors for sets of 3 or 4 beans, with some small errors for sets of 5 beans, 
and with increasing magnitudes of error as a function of set size thereafter, up to 15 beans. 
Despite the problematic nature of the method (in that the bean thrower was also the bean 
judge), the finding that normal adults typically can keep in mind only about 3 or 4 items has 
been replicated many times in modern research, using methods similar to Jevons (e.g., 
Mandler & Shebo, 1982) and using many other methods (Cowan, 2001). The limited amount 
that could be held in mind at once played an important role in early experimental 
psychology, e.g., in the early experimental work of Hermann Ebbinghaus (1885/1913) and 
Wilhelm Wundt (1894/1998). On the American front, William James (1890) wrote about a 
distinction between primary memory, the items in consciousness and the trailing edge of 
what is perceived in the world, and secondary memory, the items in storage but not currently 
in consciousness. Recent investigators have considered multiple possible reasons why 
primary memory might be limited to just a few items at once, including biological accounts 
based on the need to avoid confusion between concurrent objects in memory, and 
evolutionary and teleological accounts based on ideas about what capacity might be ideal for 
learning and memory retrieval (Cowan, 2010; Sweller, 2011), but as yet the reason is 
unknown.
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Ubiquity of the Working Memory Concept
When we say that working memory holds a small amount of information, by this term we 
may be referring to something as abstract as ideas that can be contemplated, or something as 
concrete as objects that can be counted (e.g., beans). The main point of information is that it 
is the choice of some things out of a greater set of possible things. One of the exciting 
aspects of working memory is that it may be important on so many different levels, and in so 
many different situations. When you are listening to language, you need to retain 
information about the beginning of the sentence until you can make sense of it. If you hear 
Jean would like to visit the third building on the left you need to recall that the actor in the 
sentence is Jean. Then you need to retain the verb until you know what it is she would like 
to visit, and you need to retain the adjective “third” until you know, third what; and all of the 
pieces must be put together in the right way. Without sufficient working memory, the 
information would be lost before you could combine it into a coherent, complete thought. As 
another example of how working memory is used, when doing simple arithmetic in your 
head, if you want to add 24 and 18 you may need to find that 4+8=12, retain the 2 while 
carrying the 1 over to the tens column to make 2+1+1=4 in the tens column, and integrate 
with the ones columns to arrive at the answer, 42. As a third example, if you are searching 
for your car in a parking lot, you have to remember the layout of the cars in the region you 
just searched so that you can avoid wasting time searching the same region again. In the 
jungle, a predator that turns its vision away from a scene and revisits it moments later may 
use working memory to detect that something in the scene has shifted; this change detection 
may indicate the presence of prey.
So the information in working memory can range from spoken words and printed digits to 
cars and future meals. It can even encompass abstract ideas. Consider whether a young child 
can get a good understanding of what is or is not a tiger (a matter of word category concepts, 
e.g., Nelson, 1974; Saltz, Soller, & Sigel, 1972). The concept is, in lay terms, a big cat with 
stripes. It excludes lions, which have no stripes, and it excludes zebras, which are not big 
cats. The child must be able to keep in mind the notion of a cat and the notion of stripes at 
the same time in order to grasp the tiger concept correctly. If the child thinks only of the 
stripes, he or she may incorrectly label a zebra as a tiger. The concept presumably starts out 
in working memory and, once it is learned, is transferred to long-term memory. At first, an 
incomplete concept might be stored in long-term memory, leading to misconceptions that 
are corrected later when discrepancies with further input are noticed and working memory is 
used to amend the concept in long-term memory. On a more abstract plane, there are more 
semantic issues mastered somewhat later in childhood (e.g., Clark & Garnica, 1974). The 
concept of bringing something seems to require several conditions: the person doing the 
bringing must have something at a location other than the speaker’s location (or future 
planned location), and must accompany that thing to the speaker’s location. You can ask the 
person to bring a salad to your house, but probably not to take a salad to your house (unless 
you are not there), and not to send a salad to your house (unless they are not coming along). 
These conditions can tax working memory. Again, the child’s initial concept transferred 
from working memory to long-term memory may be incomplete, and amended later when 
discrepancies with further input are noticed.
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Working Memory: The Past 64 Years
There are several modern beginnings for the working memory concept. Hebb (1949) had an 
outlook on temporary memory that was more neurologically based than the earlier concept 
of primary memory of James (1890). He spoke of ideas as mediated by assemblies of cells 
firing in a specific pattern for each idea or concept, and only a few cell assemblies would be 
active, with current neural firing, at any moment. This vision has played an important role in 
the field. An issue that is raised by this work is whether working memory should be 
identified with all of the active information that can be used in immediate memory tests, 
whether conscious or not, or whether it should be reserved to describe only the conscious 
information, more in the flavor of James. Given that working memory is a term usually used 
to explain behavioral outcomes rather than subjective reports, it is typically not restricted to 
conscious primary memory (e.g., see Baddeley, 1986; Baddeley & Hitch, 1974; Cowan, 
1988). Cowan explicitly suggested that there are two aspects of working memory storage: 
(1) the activated portion of long-term memory, perhaps corresponding to Hebb’s active cell 
assemblies, and (2) within that activated portion, a smaller subset of items in the focus of 
attention. The activated memory would consist of a fragmented soup of all kinds of activated 
features (sensory, phonological, orthographic, spatial, and semantic), whereas the focus of 
attention would contain just a few well-integrated items or chunks.
Contributions of George Miller—Miller (1956) discussed the limitation in how many 
items can be held in immediate memory. In the relevant test procedure, a list of items is seen 
or heard and immediately afterward (that is, with no imposed retention interval), the list 
must be repeated verbatim. The ability to do so was said to be limited to about seven chunks, 
where a chunk is a meaningful unit. For example, the random digit list 582931 may have to 
be encoded initially as six chunks, one per digit, whereas the sequence 123654 probably can 
be encoded by most adults as only two chunks (an ascending triplet followed by a 
descending triplet). Subsequent work has suggested that the number seven is a practical 
result that emerges on the basis of strategies that participants use and that, when it is not 
possible to use chunking or covert verbal rehearsal to help performance, adults typically can 
retain only 3 or 4 pre-existing chunks (Chen & Cowan, 2009; Cowan, 2001; Cowan, 
Rouder, Blume, & Saults, 2012; Luck & Vogel, 1997; Rouder et al., 2008).
The first mention I have found of the term working memory comes from a book by Miller, 
Galanter, and Pribram (1960), Plans and the structure of behavior. The title itself, and the 
concept of organization, seems reminiscent of the earlier work by Hebb (1949), The 
organization of behavior. Miller et al. observed that daily functioning in the world requires a 
hierarchy of plans. For example, your plan to do well at work requires a sub-plan to be there 
at time in the morning, which in turn may require sub-plans to eat breakfast, shower, get 
dressed, gather work materials, and so on. Each of these plans also may have sub-plans, and 
you may have competing plans (such as choosing an after-work activity, calling your 
mother, or acquiring food for dinner). Our working memory was said to be the mental 
faculty whereby we remember the plans and sub-plans. We cannot think about all of them at 
once but we might, for example, keep in mind that the frying pan is hot while retrieving a 
knife from the drawer, and we may keep bringing to mind the approximate time so as not to 
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be late. Working memory was said to be the facility that is used to carry out one sub-plan 
while keeping in mind the necessary related sub-plans and the master plan.
Contributions of Donald Broadbent—In Great Britain, Broadbent’s (1958) book 
helped to bring the conversation out of the behaviorist era and into an era of cognitive 
psychology. In a footnote within the book, he sketched a rough information processing 
diagram that showed information progressing from a sensory type of store that holds a lot of 
information briefly, through an attention filter to essentially a working memory that holds 
only a few items, to a long-term memory that is our storehouse of knowledge accumulated 
through a lifetime. The empirical basis for the model came largely from his work with 
selective attention, including many dichotic listening studies in which the task was to listen 
to the message from one ear and ignore the message from the other ear, or report both 
messages in some order. The motivation for this kind of research came largely from 
practical issues provoked by World War II, such as how to help a pilot listen to his own air 
traffic control message while ignoring messages meant for other pilots but presented in the 
same channel. An important theoretical outcome, however, was the discovery of a difference 
between a large-capacity but short-lived sensory memory that was formed regardless of 
attention, and a longer-lived but small-capacity abstract working memory that required 
attention.
Contributions of Alan Baddeley and Graham Hitch—Miller et al. (1960) may have 
devised the term working memory but they were not the predominant instigator of the work 
that has occurred subsequently in the field. Google Scholar does show it with over 5,600 
citations. A chapter by Baddeley and Hitch (1974), though, is listed with over 7,400 
citations and a 1992 Science article summarizing that approach has over 14,500 citations. In 
the 1974 chapter, the term working memory was used to indicate a system of temporary 
memory that is multifaceted, unlike the single store such as James’ primary memory, or the 
corresponding box in Broadbent’s (1958) model, or an elaborated version of it as in the 
model of Atkinson and Shiffrin (1968) model, none of which would do. In fact, a lot of 
investigators in the 1960’s proposed variations of information processing models that 
included a single short-term memory store, and Baddeley often has referred to these 
together, humorously, as the “modal model,” providing a sketch of it with sensory memory, 
short-term memory, and long-term memory boxes as in the Broadbent and the Atkinson/
Shiffrin models. (When the humor and the origin of the phrase “modal model” are forgotten, 
yet the phrase is still widely used, it seems sad somehow.)
The main point emphasized by Baddeley and Hitch (1974) is that there were diverse effects 
that appeared to implicate short-term memory, but that did not converge to a single 
component. Phonological processing interfered most with phonological storage, visual-
spatial processing interfered with visual-spatial storage, and a working memory load did not 
seem to interfere much with superior memory for the end of a list, or recency effect. 
Conceptual learning did not depend heavily on the type of memory that was susceptible to 
phonological similarity effects, and a patient with a very low memory span was still able to 
learn new facts. To account for all of the dissociations, they ended up concluding that there 
was an attention-related control system and various storage systems. These included a 
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phonological system that also included a covert verbal rehearsal process, and a visual-spatial 
storage system that might have its own type of non-verbal rehearsal. In the 1974 version of 
the theory, there were attention limits on the storage of information as well as on processing. 
In a 1986 book, Baddeley eliminated the attention-dependent storage but in a 2000 paper, a 
new component was added in the form of an episodic buffer. This buffer might or might not 
be attention-dependent and is responsible for holding semantic information for the short 
term, as well as the specific binding or association between phonological and visual-spatial 
information. Baddeley and Hitch called the assembly or system of storage and processing in 
service of holding information in an accessible form working memory, the memory one uses 
in carrying out cognitive tasks of various kinds (i.e., cognitive work).
Model of Cowan (1988)—Through the years, there were several other proposals that alter 
the flavor of the working memory proposal. Cowan (1988) was concerned with how we 
represent what we know and do not know about information processing. The “modal 
models” of which Baddeley has spoken began with Broadbent’s (1958) model in which the 
boxes were shown to be accessed in sequence, comparable to a computer flow chart: first 
sensory memory, then an attention filter, then short-term memory, and then long-term 
memory. Atkinson & Shiffrin (1968) preserved the flow chart structure but added recursive 
entry into the boxes, in the form of the control processes. Baddeley and Hitch (1974) and 
Baddeley (1986) instead used a processing diagram in which the boxes could be accessed in 
parallel. One presumably could enter some information into phonological storage while 
concurrently entering other information into visual-spatial storage, with interacting modules 
and concurrent executive control.
Cowan (1988, 1995, 1999, 2001, 2005) recoiled a bit from the modules and separate boxes, 
partly because they might well form an arbitrarily incomplete taxonomy of the systems in 
the brain. (Where would spatial information about sound go? Where would touch 
information go? These types of unanswered questions also may have helped motivate the 
episodic buffer of Baddeley, 2000.) There could be multiple modules, but because we do not 
know the taxonomy, they were all thrown into the soup of activated long-term memory. 
Instead of separate boxes, I attempted to model on a higher level at which distinctions that 
were incomplete were not explicitly drawn into the model, and mechanisms could be 
embedded in other mechanisms. Thus, there was said to be a long-term memory, a subset of 
which was in an activated state (cf. Hebb, 1949), and within that, a smaller subset of which 
was in the focus of attention (cf. James, 1890). Dissociations could still occur on the basis of 
similarity of features; two items with phonological features will interfere with one another, 
for example, more than one item with phonological features and another item with only 
visual-spatial features. The model still included central executive processes.
Compared to Baddeley and Hitch (1974), Cowan (1988) also placed more emphasis on 
sensory memory. It is true that printed letters, like spoken letters, are encoded with speech-
based, phonological features that can be confused with each other in working memory (e.g., 
Conrad, 1964). Nevertheless, there is abundant other evidence that lists presented in a 
spoken form are remembered much better, in particular at the end of the list, than verbal lists 
presented in printed form (e.g., Murdock & Walker, 1969; Penney, 1989).
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The attention filter also was internalized in the model of Cowan (1988). Instead of 
information having to pass through a filter, it was assumed that all information activates 
long-term memory to some degree. The mind forms a neural model of what it has processed. 
This will include sensory information for all stimuli but, in the focus of attention, much 
more semantic information than one finds for unattended information. Incoming information 
that matches the current neural model becomes habituated, but changes that are perceived 
cause dishabituation in the form of attentional orienting responses toward the dishabituated 
stimuli (cf. Sokolov, 1963). Such a system has properties similar to the attenuated filtering 
model of Treisman (1960) or the pertinence model of Normal (1968). Attention is controlled 
in this view dually, often with a struggle between voluntary executive control and 
involuntary orienting responses.
How consistent is Cowan (1988) with the Baddeley and Hitch model? 
Contributions of Robert Logie—With the addition of the episodic buffer, the model of 
Baddeley and Hitch makes predictions that are often similar to those of Cowan (1988). 
There still may be important differences, though. An open question is whether the activated 
portion of long-term memory of Cowan (1988) functionally serves the same purpose as the 
phonological and visual-spatial buffers of Baddeley and Hitch (1974) and Baddeley (1986). 
Robert Logie and colleagues argue that this cannot be, inasmuch as visual imagery and 
visual short-term memory are dissociated (Borst, Niven, & Logie, 2012; Logie & van der 
Meulen, 2009; van der Meulen, Logie, & Della Sala, 2009). Irrelevant visual materials 
interfere with the formation of visual imagery but not with visual storage, whereas tapping 
in a spatial pattern interferes with visual storage but not the formation of visual images. 
According to the model that these sources put forward, visual imagery involves activation of 
long-term memory representations, whereas visual short-term storage is a separate buffer. 
Although this is a possibility that warrants further research, I am not yet convinced. There 
could be other reasons for the dissociation. For example, in the study of van der Meulen et 
al., the visual imagery task involved detecting qualities of the letters presented (curved line 
or not, enclosed space or not, etc.) and these qualities could overlap more with the picture 
interference; whereas the visual memory task involved remembering letters in upper and 
lower case visually, in the correct serial order, and the serial order property may suffer more 
interference from tapping in a sequential spatial pattern. Testing of the generality of the 
effects across tasks with different features is needed.
Other models of cross-domain generality—One difference between the Baddeley 
(1986) framework and that of Cowan (1988) was that Cowan placed more emphasis on the 
possibility of interference between domains. There has been a continuing controversy about 
the extent to which verbal and nonverbal codes in working memory interfere with one 
another (e.g., Cocchini, Logie, Della Sala, MacPherson, & Baddeley, 2002; Cowan & 
Morey, 2007; Fougnie & Marois, 2011; Morey & Bieler, 2013). The domain-general view 
has extended to other types of research. Daneman and Carpenter (1980) showed that reading 
and remembering words are tasks that interfere with one another, with the success of 
remembering in the presence of reading a strong correlate of reading comprehension ability. 
Engle and colleagues (e.g., Engle, Tuholski, Laughlin, & Conway, 1999; Kane et al., 2004) 
showed that this sort of effect does not just occur with verbal materials, but occurs even with 
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storage and processing in separate domains, such as spatial recall with verbal memory. They 
attributed individual differences primarily to the processing tasks and the need to hold in 
mind task instructions and goals while suppressing irrelevant distractions.
Barrouillet and colleagues (e.g., Barrouillet, Portrat, & Camos, 2011; Vergauwe, Barrouillet, 
& Camos, 2010) emphasized that the process of using attention to refresh items, no matter 
whether verbal or nonverbal in nature, takes time and counteracts decay. They provided 
complex tasks involving concurrent storage and processing, like Daneman and Carpenter 
and like Engle and colleagues. The key measure is cognitive load, the proportion of time that 
is taken up by the processing task rather than being free for the participant to use to refresh 
the representations of items to be remembered. The finding of Barrouillet and colleagues has 
been that the effect of cognitive load on the length of list that can be recalled, or memory 
span, is a negative linear (i.e., deleterious) effect. They do also admit that there is a verbal 
rehearsal process that is separate from attentional refreshing, with the option of using either 
mode of memory maintenance depending on the task demands (Camos, Mora, & Oberauer, 
2011), but there is more emphasis on attentional refreshing than in the case of Baddeley and 
colleagues, and the approach therefore seems more in keeping with Cowan (1988) with its 
focus of attention (regarding refreshing see also Cowan, 1992).
Ongoing controversies about the nature of working-memory memory limits—
There are theoretically two basic ways in which working memory could be more limited 
than long-term memory. First, It could be limited in terms of how many items can be held at 
once, a capacity limit that Cowan (1998, 2001) tentatively ascribes to the focus of attention. 
Second, it could be limited in the amount of time for which an item remains in working 
memory when it is no longer rehearsed or refreshed, a decay limit that Cowan (1988) 
ascribed to the activated portion of long-term memory, the practical limit being up to about 
30 seconds depending on the task.
Both of these limits are currently controversial. Regarding the capacity limit, there is not 
much argument that, within a particular type of stimulus coding (phonological, visual-
spatial, etc.), normal adults are limited to about 3 or 4 meaningful units or chunks. The 
debate is whether the limit occurs in the focus of attention, or because materials of similar 
sorts interfere with one another (e.g., Oberauer, Lewandowsky, Farrell, Jarrold, & Greaves, 
2012). In my recent, still-unpublished work, I suggest that the focus of attention is limited to 
several chunks of information, but that these chunks can be off-loaded to long-term memory 
and held there, with the help of some attentional refreshing, while the focus of attention is 
primarily used to encode additional information.
Regarding the memory loss or decay limit, some studies have shown no loss of information 
for lists of printed verbal materials across periods in which rehearsal and refreshing have 
apparently been prevented (Lewandowsky, Duncan, & Brown, 2004; Oberauer & 
Lewandowsky, 2008). Nevertheless, for arrays of unfamiliar characters followed by a mask 
to eliminate sensory memory, Ricker and Cowan (2010) did find memory loss or decay (cf. 
Zhang & Luck, 2009). In further work, Ricker et al. (in press) suggested that the amount of 
decay depends on how well the information is consolidated in working memory (cf. 
Jolicoeur & Dell'Acqua, 1998). Given that the time available for refreshing appeared to be 
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inversely related to the cognitive load, the consolidation process that seems critical is not 
interrupted by a mask but continues after it. This consolidation process could be some sort 
of strengthening of the episodic memory trace based on attentional refreshing in the spirit of 
Barrouillet et al. (2011). If so, the most important effect of this refreshing would not be to 
reverse the effects of decay temporarily, as Barrouillet et al. proposed, but rather to alter the 
rate of decay itself. Our plans for future research include investigation of these possibilities.
Long-term working memory—It is clear that people function quite well in complex 
environments in which detailed knowledge must be used in an expert manner, despite a 
severe limit in working memory to a few ideas or items at once. What is critical in 
understanding this paradox of human performance is that each slot in working memory can 
be filled with a concept of great complexity, provided that the individual has the necessary 
knowledge in long-term memory. This point was made by Miller (1956) in his concept of 
combining items to form larger chunks of information, with the limit in working memory 
found in the number of chunks, not the number of separate items presented for 
memorization. Ericsson and Kintsch (1995) took this concept further by expanding the 
definition of working memory to include relevant information in long-term memory.
Although we might quibble about the best definition of working memory, it seems 
undeniable that long-term memory is often used as Ericsson and Kintsch (1995) suggest. An 
example is what happens when one is holding a conversation with a visitor that is 
interrupted by a telephone call. During the call, the personal conversation with one’s visitor 
is typically out of conscious working memory. After the call, however, with the visitor 
serving as a vivid cue, it is often possible to retrieve a memory of the conversation as a 
recent episode and to remember where this conversation left off. That might not be possible 
some days later. This use of long-term memory to serve a function similar to the traditional 
working memory, thus expanding the person’s capabilities, was termed long-term working 
memory by Ericsson and Kintsch. Cowan (1995) alluded to a similar use of long-term 
memory for this purpose but, not wanting to expand the definition of working memory, 
called the function virtual short-term memory, meaning a use of long-term memory in a way 
that short-term memory is usually used. It is much like the use of computer memory that 
allows the computer to be turned off in hibernation mode and later returned to its former 
state when the memory is retrieved.
Given the ability of humans to use long-term memory so adeptly, one could ask why we care 
about the severe working memory capacity limit at all. The answer is that it is critical when 
there is limited long-term knowledge of the topic. In such circumstances, the capacity of 
working memory can determine how many items can be held in mind at once in order to use 
the items together, or to link them to form a new concept in long-term memory. This is the 
case in many situations that are important for learning and comprehension. One simple 
example of using items together is following a set of instructions, e.g., to a preschool child, 
put your drawing in your cubby and then go sit in the circle. Part of that instruction may be 
forgotten before it is carried out and teachers must be sensitive to that possibility. A simple 
example of linking items together is in reading a novel, when one listens to a description of 
a character and melds the parts of the description to arrive at an overall personality sketch 
that can be formed in long-term memory. Inadequate use of working memory during reading 
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may lead to the sketch being incomplete, as some descriptive traits are inadvertently 
ignored. Knowledge of this working memory limit can be used to improve one’s writing by 
making it easier to remember and comprehend.
Paas and Sweller (2012) bring up the distinction between biologically primary and 
secondary knowledge (Geary, 2008) and suggest (p. 29) that “Humans are easily able to 
acquire huge amounts of biologically primary knowledge outside of educational contexts 
and without a discernible working memory load.” Examples they offered were the learning 
of faces and learning to speak. It may well be the case that individual faces or spoken words 
quickly become integrated chunks in long-term memory (and, I would add, the same seems 
true for objects in domains of learned expertise, e.g., written words in adults). Nevertheless, 
the biologically-primary components are used in many situations in which severe capacity 
limits do apply. In these situations, the added memory demand is considered biologically 
secondary. An example is learning which face should be associated with which name. If four 
novel faces are shown on a screen and their names are vocally presented, these name-face 
pairs cannot be held in working memory at once, so it is difficult to retain the information 
and it often takes additional study of one pair at a time to remember the name-face pairing.
Specific mathematical models—Here I have been selective in examining models of 
working memory that are rather overarching and verbally specified. By limiting the domain 
of applicability and adding some processing assumptions, other researchers throughout the 
years have been able to formulate models that make mathematical predictions of 
performance in specific situations. We have learned a lot from them but they are essentially 
outside of the scope of this review given limited space and given my own limitations. For 
examples of such models see Brown, Neath, & Chater, 2007; Burgess & Hitch, 1999; 
Cowan et al., 2012; Farrell & Lewandowsky, 2002; Hensen, 1998; Murdock, 1982; 
Oberauer & Lewandowsky, 2011). The importance of these models is that they make clear 
the consequences of our theoretical assumptions. In order to make quantitative predictions, 
each mathematical assumption must be made explicit. It is sometimes found that the effects 
of certain proposed mechanisms, taken together, are not what one might assume from a 
purely verbal theory. Of course, some of the assumptions that one must make to eke out 
quantitative predictions may be unsupported, so I believe that the best way forward in the 
field is to use general verbal, propositional thinking some of the time and specific 
quantitative modeling other times, working toward a convergence of these methods toward a 
common theory.
Summary: Status of Working Memory
The progress in this field might be likened to an upward spiral. We make steady progress but 
meanwhile, we go in circles. The issues of the nature of working memory limits have not 
changed much from the early days. Why is the number of items limited? Why is the duration 
limited? What makes us forget? How is it related to the conscious mind and to neural 
processes? These questions are still not answered. At the same time, we have agreement 
about what can be found in particular circumstances. Set up the stimuli one way, and there is 
interference between modalities. Set it up another way and there appears to be much less 
interference. Set it up one way and items are lost rapidly across time. Set it up a different 
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way, and there is much less loss. There are brain areas associated with the focus of attention 
and with working memory across modalities (Cowan, 2011; Cowan, Li et al., 2011; Todd & 
Marois, 2004; Xu & Chun, 2006). This is progress awaiting an adequate unifying theory.
What we do know has practical implications. To avoid overtaxing an individual’s working-
memory capabilities, one should avoid presenting more than a few items or ideas at once, 
unless the items can be rapidly integrated. One should also avoid making people hold on to 
unintegrated information for a very long time. For example, I could write a taxing sentence 
like, It is said that, if your work is not overwhelming, your car is in good repair, and the 
leaves have changed color, it is a good time for a fall vacation. However, that sentence 
requires a lot from the reader’s working memory. I could reduce the working memory load 
by not making you wait for the information that provides the unifying theme, keeping the 
working memory load low: It is said that a good time for a fall vacation is when your work 
is not overwhelming, your car is in good repair, and the leaves have changed color.
Working Memory and Cognitive Development
There is no question that working-memory capabilities increase across the life span of the 
individual. In early tests of maturation (e.g., Bolton, 1892), and to this day in tests of 
intelligence, children have been asked to repeat lists of random digits. The length of list that 
can be successfully repeated on some predefined proportion of trials is the digit span. It 
increases steadily with childhood maturation, until late childhood. When the complexity of 
the task is increased, the time to adult-like performance is extended a bit further, with steady 
improvement throughout childhood (for an example see Gathercole, Pickering, Ambridge, & 
Wearing, 2004).
As we saw in the introductory section, clear practical findings do not typically come with a 
clear understanding of the theoretical explanation. There have been many explanations over 
the years for the finding of increasing memory span with age (e.g., see Bauer & Fivush, in 
press; Courage & Cowan, 2009; Kail, 1990). These explanations may lead to differing 
opinions of the best course for learning and education, as well.
Explanations Based on Capacity
Explanations of intellectual growth based on working memory capacity stem from what has 
been called the neoPiagetian school of thought. Jean Piaget outlined a series of 
developmental stages, but with no known underlying reason for the progression between 
stages. Pascual-Leone and Smith (1969) attributed the developmental increases to increases 
in the number of items that could be held in mind at once.
The theory becomes more explicit with the contributions of Halford, Phillips, and Wilson 
(1998) and Andrews and Halford (2002). They suggests that it is the number of associations 
between elements that is restricted and that this matters because it limits the complexity of 
thought. In my example above, the concept of a tiger versus lion versus zebra requires 
concurrent consideration of the animal’s shape and presence or absence of stripes. Similarly, 
addition requires the association between three elements: the two elements being added and 
the sum. A concept like bigger than is a logical relation requiring three slots, e.g., bigger 
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than (dog, elephant). Ratios require the coordination of four elements (e.g., 4/6 is equivalent 
to 6/9) and therefore are considerably harder to grasp, according to the theory (see Halford, 
Cowan, & Andrews, 2007).
This concept is quite promising and might even appear to be “the only game in town” when 
it comes to trying to understand the age limits on children’s ability to comprehend ideas of 
various levels of complexity. One problem with it is that it is not always straightforward to 
determine the arity of a concept, or number of ideas that must be associated. For example, a 
young child might understand the concept big(elephant) and then might be able to infer that 
elephants are bigger than dogs, without being able to use the concept of bigger than in a 
consistent manner more generally. The concept from Miller (1956) that items can be 
combined using knowledge to form larger chunks also applies to associations, and it is not 
clear how to be sure that the level of complexity actually is what it is supposed to be. 
Knowledge allows some problems to be solved with less working memory requirement.
Explanations Based on Knowledge
It is beyond question that knowledge increases with age. Perhaps this knowledge increase is 
the sole reason for developmental change in working memory, it has been argued. Chi 
(1978) showed that children with an expertise in the game of chess could remember chess 
configurations better than adults with no such expertise. The expert children presumably 
could form larger chunks of chess pieces, greatly reducing the memory load. Case, Kurland, 
and Goldberg (1982) gave adults materials that were unfamiliar and found that both the 
speed of item identification and the memory span for those materials closely resembled what 
was found for 6-year-olds on familiar materials. The implication was that the familiarity 
with the materials determines the processing speed, which in turn determines the span.
Explanations Based on Processing Speed and Strategies
Case et al. (1982) talked of a familiarity difference leading to a speed difference. Others 
have suggested that, more generally, speed of processing increases with age in childhood 
and decrease again with old age (e.g., Kail & Salthouse, 1994). This has led to accounts of 
working memory improvement based on an increased rate of covert verbal rehearsal (Hulme 
& Tordoff, 1989) or increased rate of attentional refreshing (Barrouillet, Gavens, Vergauwe, 
Gaillard, & Camos, 2009; Camos & Barrouillet, 2011). At the lower end of childhood, it has 
been suggested on the basis of various evidence that young children do not rehearse at all 
(Flavell, Beach, & Chinsky, 1966; Garrity, 1975; Henry, 1991) or do not rehearse in a 
sufficiently sophisticated manner that is needed to assist in recall (Ornstein & Naus, 1978). 
When rehearsal aloud is required, the result suggest that the most recently rehearsed items 
are recalled best (Tan & Ward, 2000).
This view that rehearsal is actually important has been opposed recently. It is not clear that 
rehearsal must be invoked to explain performance (Jarrold & Citroën, 2013) and if rehearsal 
takes place, it is not clear exactly what the internal processes are (e.g., cumulative repetition 
of the list? Repetition of each item as it is presented?).
In the case of using attention to refresh information, an interesting case can be made. 
Children who are too young (about 4 years of age and younger) do not seem to use attention 
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to refresh items. For them, the limit in performance depends on the duration of the retention 
interval. For older children and adults, who are able to refresh, it is not the absolute duration 
but the cognitive load that determines performance (Barrouillet et al., 2011). The “phase 
change” in performance that is observed here with the advent of refreshing is perhaps 
comparable to the phase change that is seen with the advent of verbal rehearsal (Henry, 
1991), though the evidence may be stronger in the case of refreshing.
Re-assessment of Capacity Accounts
We have seen that there are multiple ways in which children’s working memory 
performance gets better with maturity. There are reasons to care about whether the growth of 
capacity is primary, or whether it is derived from some other type of development. For 
example, if the growth of capacity results only from the growth of knowledge, then it should 
be possible to teach any concept at any age, if the concept can be made familiar enough. If 
capacity differences come from speed differences, it might be possible to allow more time 
by making sure that the parts to be incorporated into a new concept are presented 
sufficiently slowly.
We have done a number of experiments suggesting that there is something to capacity that 
changes independent of these other factors. Regarding knowledge, relevant evidence was 
provided by Cowan, Nugent, Elliott, Ponomarev, and Saults (1999) in their test of memory 
for digits that were unattended while a silent picture-rhyming game was carried out. The 
digits were attended only occasionally, when a recall cue was presented about 1 s after the 
last digit. The performance increase with age throughout the elementary school years was 
just as big for small digits (1, 2, 3), which are likely to be familiar, as for large digits (7, 8, 
9), which are less familiar. Gilchrist, Cowan, and Naveh-Benjamin (2009) further examined 
memory for lists of unrelated, spoken sentences in order to distinguish between a measure of 
capacity and a measure of linguistic knowledge. The measure of capacity was an access rate, 
the number of sentences that were at least partly recalled. The measure of linguistic 
knowledge was a completion rate, the proportion of a sentence that was recalled, provided 
that at least part of it was recalled. This sentence completion rate was about 80% for both 
first and sixth grader children, suggesting that for these simple sentences, there was no age 
difference in knowledge. Nevertheless, the number of sentences accessed was considerably 
smaller in first-grade children than in sixth-grade children (about 2.5 sentences vs. 4 
sentences). I conclude, tentatively at least, that knowledge differences cannot account for the 
age difference in working memory capacity.
We have used a different procedure to help rule out a number of factors that potentially 
could underlie the age difference in observed capacity. It is based on a procedure that has 
been well-researched in adults (Luck & Vogel, 1997). On each trial of this procedure, an 
array of simple items (such as colored squares) is presented briefly and followed by a 
retention interval of about 1 s, and then a single probe item is presented. The latter is to be 
judged identical to the array item from the same location, or a new item. This task is 
convenient partly because there are mathematical ways to estimate the number of items in 
working memory (Cowan, 2001). If k items are in working memory and there are N items in 
the array, the likelihood that the probed item is known is k/N, and a correct response can 
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also come from guessing. It is possible to calculate k, which for this procedure is equal to 
N(h-f), where h refers the proportion of change trials in which the change was detected (hits) 
and f refers to the proportion of no-change trials in which a change was incorrectly reported 
(false alarms).
One possibility is that younger children remember less of the requested information because 
they attend to more irrelevant information, cluttering working memory (for adults, cf. Vogel, 
McCollough, & Machizawa, 2005). To examine this, Cowan, Morey, AuBuchon, Zwilling, 
and Gilchrist (2010) presented both colored circles and colored triangles and instructed 
participants to pay closer attention to one shape, which was tested on 80% of the trials in 
critical blocks. When there were 2 triangles and 2 circles, memory for the more heavily-
attended shape was better than memory for the less-attended shape, to the same extent in 
children in Grades 1–2 and Grades 6–7, and in college students. Yet, the number of items in 
working memory was much lower in children in Grades 1–2 than in the two older groups. It 
did not seem that the inability to filter out irrelevant information accounted for the age 
difference in capacity.
Another possibility is that in Cowan et al. (2010), the array items occurred too fast for the 
younger children to encode correctly. To examine this, Cowan, AuBuchon, Gilchrist, 
Ricker, & Saults (2011) presented the items one at a time at relatively slow, a 1-item-per-
second rate. The results remained the same as before. In some conditions, the participant had 
to repeat each color as it was presented or else say “wait” to suppress rehearsal; this 
articulatory manipulation, too, left the developmental effect unchanged. It appears that 
neither encoding speed nor articulation could account for the age differences. So we believe 
that age differences in capacity may be primary rather than derived from another process.
Age differences in capacity still could occur because of age differences in the speed of a 
rapid process of refreshment, and from the absence of refreshment in young children 
(Camos & Barrouillet, 2011). Alternatively, it could occur because of age differences in 
some other type of speed, neural space, or efficiency. This remains to be seen but at least we 
believe that there is a true maturational change in working memory capacity underlying age 
differences in the ability to comprehend materials of different complexity. This is in addition 
to profound effects of knowledge acquisition and the ability to use strategies.
The use of strategies themselves may be secondary to the available working memory 
resources to carry out those strategies. According to the neoPiagetian view of Pascual-Leone 
and Smith (1969), for example, the tasks themselves share resources with the data being 
stored. Cowan et al. (2010) found that when the size of the array to be remembered was 
large (3 more-relevant and 3 less-relevant items, rather than 2 of each) then young children 
were no longer able to allocate more attention to the more-relevant items. The attentional 
resource allocated to the items in the array was apparently deducted from the resource 
available to allocate attention optimally.
In practical terms, it is worth remembering that several aspects of working memory are 
likely to develop: capacity, speed, knowledge, and the use of strategies. Although it is not 
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always easy to know which process is primary, these aspects of development all should 
contribute in some way to our policies regarding learning and education.
Working Memory and Learning
In early theories of information processing, up through the current period, working memory 
was viewed as a portal to long-term memory. In order for information to enter long-term 
memory in a form that allows later retrieval, it first must be present in working memory in a 
suitable form. Sometimes that form appears modality-specific. For example, Baddeley, 
Papagno, and Vallar (1988) wondered how it could be that a patient with a very small verbal 
short-term memory span, 2 or 3 digits at most, could function so well in most ways and 
exhibit normal learning capabilities. The answer turned out to be that she displayed a very 
selective deficit: she was absolutely unable to learn new vocabulary. This finding led to a 
series of developmental studies showing that individual differences in phonological memory 
are quite important for differences in word-learning capability in both children and adults 
(Baddeley, Gathercole, & Papagno, 1998; Gathercole & Baddeley, 1989, 1990).
Aside from this specific domain, there are several ways in which working memory can 
influence learning. It is important to have sufficient working memory for concept formation. 
The control processes and mnemonic strategies used with working memory also are critical 
to learning.
Working Memory and Concept Formation
Learning might be thought of in an educational context as the formation of new concepts. 
These new concepts occur when existing concepts are joined or bound together. Some of 
this binding is mundane. If an individual knows what the year 1776 means and also what the 
Declaration of Independence is (at least in enough detail to remember the title of the 
declaration), then it is possible to learn the new concept that the Declaration of 
Independence was written in the year 1776. Other times, the binding of concepts may be 
more interesting and there may be a new conceptual leap involved. For example, a striped 
cat is a tiger. As another simple example, to understand what a parallelogram is, the child 
has to understand what the word parallel means, and further to grasp that two sets of parallel 
lines intersect with one another. The ideas presumably must co-exist in working memory for 
the concept to be formed.
For the various types of concept formation, then, the cauldron is assumed to be working 
memory. According to my own view, the binding of ideas occurs more specifically in the 
focus of attention. We have taken a first step toward verifying that hypothesis. Cowan, 
Donnell, and Saults (in press) presented lists of words with an incidental task: to report the 
most interesting word in each presented list. Later, participants completed a surprise test in 
which they were asked whether pairs of words came from the same list; the words were 
always one or two serial positions apart in their respective lists, but sometimes were from 
the same list and sometimes from different lists. The notion was that the link between the 
words in the same list would be formed only if the words had been in the focus of attention 
at the same time, which was much more likely for short lists than for long lists. In keeping 
with this hypothesis, performance was better for words from short lists of 3 items (about 
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59%) than for words from lists of 6 or 9 items (about 53%). This is a small effect, but it is 
still important that there was unintentional learning of the association between items that 
were together in the focus of attention just once, when there was no intention of learning the 
association.
The theory of Halford et al. (1998) may be the best articulated theory suggesting why a good 
working memory is important for learning. (In this discussion, a “good” working memory is 
simply one that can keep in mind sufficient items and their relations to one another to solve 
the problem at hand, which may require a sufficient combination of capacity, speed, 
knowledge, and available strategies.) More complex concepts require that one consider the 
relationship between more parts. A person’s working memory can be insufficient for a 
complex concept. It may be possible to memorize that concept with less working memory, 
but not truly to understand the concept and work with it. Take, for example, use of the 
concept of transitivity in algebra. If a+b=c+d and c+d=e, then we can conclude that a+b=e 
because equality is transitive. Yet, a person who understands the rules of algebra still would 
not be able to draw the correct inference if that person could not concurrently remember the 
two equations. Even if the equations are side by side on the page, that does not mean that 
they necessarily can be encoded into working memory at the same time, which is necessary 
in order to draw the inference. Lining up the equations vertically for the learner and then 
inviting the learner to apply the rule by rote is a method that can be used to reduce the 
working memory load, perhaps allowing the problem to be solved. However, working out 
the problem that way will not necessarily produce the insight needed to set up a new 
problem and solve it, because setting up the problem correctly requires the use of working 
memory to understand what should be lined up with what. So if the individual does not have 
sufficient working memory capacity, a rote method of solution may be helpful for the time 
being. More importantly, though, the problem could be set up in a more challenging manner 
so that the learner is in the position of having to use his or her working memory to store the 
information. By doing so, the hope is that successful solution of the problem then will result 
in more insight that allows the application of the principles to other problems. That, in fact, 
is an expression of the issues that may lead to the use of word problems in mathematics 
education.
Working Memory and Control Processes
Researchers appear to be in fairly good agreement that one of the most important aspects of 
learning is staying on task. If one does not stick to the relevant goals, one will learn 
something perhaps, but it will not be the desired learning. Individuals who test well on 
working memory tasks involving a combination of storage and processing have been shown 
to do a better job staying on task.
A good experimental example of how staying on task is tied to working memory is one 
carried out by Kane and Engle (2003) using a well-known task designed long ago by John 
Ridley Stroop. In the key condition within this task, one is to name the color of ink in which 
color words are written. Sometimes, the color of ink does not match the written color and 
there is a tendency to want to read the word instead of naming the color. This effect can be 
made more treacherous by presenting stimuli in which the word and color match on most 
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trials, so that the participant may well lapse into reading and lose track of the correct task 
goal (naming the color of ink). What that happens, the result is an error or long delay on the 
occasional trials for which the word and ink do not match. Under those circumstances, the 
individuals who are more affected by the Stroop conditions are those with relatively low 
performance on the operation span test of working memory (carrying out arithmetic 
problems while remembering words interleaved with those problems).
In more recent work, Kane et al. (2007) has shown that low-span individuals have more 
problems attending in daily life. Participants carried devices that allowed them to respond at 
unpredictable times during the day, reporting what they were doing, what they wanted to be 
doing, and so on. It was found that low-span individuals were more likely to report that their 
minds were wandering away from the tasks on which they were trying to focus attention. 
This, however, did not occur on all tasks. The span-related difference in attending was only 
for tasks in which they reported that they wanted to pay attention. When participants 
reported that they were bored and did not want to pay attention, mind-wandering was just as 
prevalent for high spans as for low spans.
Although this work was done on adults, it has implications for children as well. Gathercole, 
Lamont, and Alloway (2006) suggest that working memory failures appear to be a large part 
of learning disabilities. Children who were often accused of not trying to follow directions 
tested out as children with low working memory ability. They were often either not able to 
remember instructions or not able to muster the resources to stick to the task goal and pay 
attention continually, for the duration needed. Children with various kinds of learning and 
language disability generally test below grade level on working memory procedures, and 
children with low working memory and executive function don’t do well in school (e.g., 
Sabol & Pianta, 2012).
Of course, central executive processes must do more than just maintain the task goal. The 
way in which information is converted from one form to another, the vigilance with which 
the individual searches for meaningful connections between elements and new solutions, 
and self-knowledge about what areas are strong or weak all probably play important roles in 
learning.
Working Memory and Mnemonic Strategies
There also are special strategies that are needed for learning. For example, a sophisticated 
rehearsal strategy for free recall of a list involves a rehearsal method that is cumulative. If 
the first word on the list is a cow, the second is a fish, and the third a stone, one ideally 
should rehearse cumulatively: cow…cow, fish….cow, fish, stone… and so on (Ornstein & 
Naus, 1978). Cowan, Saults, Winterowd, and Sherk (1991) showed that young children did 
not carry out cumulative rehearsal the way older children do and could not easily be trained 
to do so, but that their memory improved when cumulative rehearsal was overtly supported 
by cumulative presentation of stimuli.
For long-term learning, maintenance rehearsal is not nearly as effective a strategy as 
elaborative rehearsal, in which a coherent story is made on the basis of the items; this takes 
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time but results in richer associations between items, enhancing long-term memory provided 
that there is time for it to be accomplished (e.g., Craik & Watkins, 1973).
In addition to verbal and elaborative rehearsal, Barrouillet and colleagues (2011) have 
discussed attentional refreshing as a working-memory maintenance process. We do not yet 
know what refreshing looks like on a moment-to-moment basis or what implications this 
kind of maintenance strategy has for long-term learning. It is a rich area for future research.
The most general mnemonic strategy is probably chunking (Miller, 1956), the formation of 
new associations or recognition of existing ones in order to reduce the number of 
independent items to keep track of in working memory. The power of chunking is seen in 
special cases in which individuals have learned to go way beyond the normal performance. 
Ericsson, Chase, and Faloon (1980) studied an individual who learned, over the course of a 
year, to repeat lists of about 80 digits from memory. He learned to do so starting with a 
myriad of athletic records that he knew so that, for example, 396 might be recoded as a 
single unit, 3.96 minutes, a fairly fast time for running the mile. After applying this intensive 
chunking strategy in practice for a year, a list of 80 digits could be reduced to several sub-
lists, each with associated sub-parts. The idea would be that the basic capacity has not 
changed but each working-memory slot is filled with quite a complex chunk. In support of 
this explanation, individuals of this sort still remain at base level (about 7 items) for lists of 
items that were not practiced in this way, e.g., letters. (For a conceptual replication see 
Ericsson, Delaney, Weaver, & Mahadevan, 2004; Wilding, 2001)
Although we cannot all reach such great heights of expert performance, we can do amazing 
things using expertise. For example, memorization of a song or poem is not like 
memorization of a random list of digits because there are logical connections between the 
words and between the lines. A little working memory then can go a long way.
The importance of a good working memory comes in when something new is learned, and 
logical connections are not yet formed so the working memory load is high. When there are 
not yet sufficient associations between the elements of a body of material, working memory 
is taxed until the material can be logically organized into a coherent structure. Working 
memory is thought to correlate most closely with fluid intelligence, the type of intelligence 
that involves figuring out solutions to new problems (e.g., Wilhelm & Engle, 2005). 
However, crystallized intelligence, the type of intelligence that involves what you know, 
also is closely related to fluid intelligence. The path I suggest here is that a good working 
memory assists in problem-solving (hence fluid intelligence); fluid intelligence and working 
memory then assist in new learning (hence crystallized intelligence).
Working Memory and Education
We have sketched the potential relation between working memory and learning. How is that 
to be translated into lessons for education? There is a large and diverse literature on this 
topic. As a starting point to illustrate this diversity, I will describe the chapters chosen for 
the book, Working memory and education (Pickering, 2006). After an introductory chapter 
on working memory (A. Baddeley), the book includes two chapters on the relation between 
working memory and reading (one by P. de Jong and another by K. Cain). There is a chapter 
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on the relation between working memory and mathematics education (R. Bull and K.A. 
Espy), learning disabilities (H.L. Swanson), attention disorders (K. Cornish and colleagues), 
and deafness (M. Keehner & J. Atkinson). Other chapters cover more general topics, 
including the role of working memory in the classroom (S. Gathercole and colleagues), the 
way to assess working memory in children (S. Pickering), and sources of working memory 
deficit (M. Minear and P. Shah). It is clear that many avenues of research relate working 
memory to education, and I cannot travel along all of them in this review.
To organize a diverse field, what I can do is to distinguish between several different basic 
approaches have been tried. First, one can try to teach to the level of the learner’s working 
memory. The points described in the article up to this point should be kept in mind when 
one is trying to discern and understand what a particular learner can and cannot do. Second, 
one can try to use training exercises to improve working memory, which, investigators have 
hoped, would allow a person to be able to learn more and solve problems more successfully. 
The message I would give here is to be wary, given the rudimentary state of the evidence in 
a difficult field and the plethora of companies selling working memory training exercises. 
Third, one might contemplate the role of working memory for the most critical goals of 
education, in a broad sense. These topics will be examined one at a time.
Teaching to the Level of Working Memory
The classic adaptation of education to cognitive development and the needs of learning has 
been to try to adjust the materials to fit the learner. For example, there has been considerable 
discussion of the need to delay teaching concepts of arithmetic at least until the children 
understand the basic underlying concept of one-to-one correspondence; that is, the idea that 
there are different numbers in a series and that each number is assigned to just one object, in 
order to count the objects (e.g., Gelman, 1982). Halford et al. (2007) provide rough 
description of what complexity of concepts to expect for each age range, based on working-
memory limits (see also Pascual-Leone & Johnson, 2011).
There also are individual differences within an age group in ability that affect how the 
materials are processed. For example, individuals lower in working memory may prefer to 
take in information using a verbatim, shallow, or surface processing strategy, rather than try 
to extract the gist (for one relevant investigation, albeit with mixed results, see Kyndt, 
Cascallar, & Dochy, 2012). The enjoyment of technological presentations may be greater in 
students with better abilities in the most relevant types of working memory (e.g., Garcia, 
Nussbaum, & Preiss, 2011). I would note that the educational enterprise requires that the 
teacher must decide whether it is best to allow the learner to use a favored strategy, which 
may be influenced by the student’s ability level, or whether it is possible in some cases to 
instill a more effective strategy even if it does not come naturally to the student.
Sweller and colleagues (Sweller, 2011; Sweller, van Merrienboer, & Paas, 1998) have 
summarized a body of research literature and a theory about the role of cognitive load in 
learning and education. Their cognitive load theory is “a theory that emphasizes working 
memory constraints as determinants of instructional design effectiveness” (Sweller et al., 
1998). The theory distinguishes between an intrinsic cognitive load that comes from material 
to be learned and an extraneous cognitive load that should be kept small enough that the 
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cognitive resources of the learner are not overly depleted by it. The theory is importantly 
placed in an evolutionary framework that I will not describe (though above I mentioned the 
theory’s incorporation of the distinction between biologically primary and secondary 
information). This theory has the advantage of being rather nuanced in that many 
ramifications of cognitive load are considered. With too high a cognitive load, one runs the 
risk of the student not being able to follow the presentation, whereas with too low a 
cognitive load, one runs the risk of insufficient engagement. In future, it might be possible to 
refine the predictions for classroom learning by combining cognitive load theory with 
theories of cognitive development, which make some specific predictions about how much 
capacity is present at a particular age in childhood (e.g., Halford et al., 2007). For further 
discussion of the theory as applied specifically to multimedia, see Schüler, Scheiter, and 
Genuchten (2011). Issues arise as to how printed items are encoded (visually, verbally, or 
both) and how much the combination of verbal and visual codes in multimedia should be 
expected to tax a common, central cognitive resource and therefore interfere with one 
another, even when they are intended to be synergic. Both in cognitive psychology and in 
education, these are key issues currently under ongoing investigation.
An advantage of multimedia and computerized instruction is the possibility of adjusting the 
instruction to the student’s level. This might be done partly on the basis of success; if the 
student succeeds, the materials can be made more challenging whereas, if the student fails, 
the materials can be made easier. One potential pitfall to watch for is that, while some 
students will want to press slightly beyond their zone of comfort and will learn well, others 
will want an easy time, and may choose to learn less than they would be capable of learning. 
One way to cope with these issues is through computerized instruction, but with a heavy 
dose of personal monitoring and adjustment to make sure that the task is sufficiently 
motivating for every student.
One factor that makes it difficult to teach to the students effectively is that the working 
memory demands of language production do not always match the demands of the 
recipients’ language comprehension. Consequently, when one is speaking or writing for 
didactic purposes, one must be careful to consider not only one’s own working memory 
needs, but also those of the listener or reader. There are several obstacles in this regard. 
Slevc (2011) showed that speakers tend to blurt out what is most readily available in 
working memory. He used situations that were to be described verbally by the participant, 
e.g., A pirate gave a book to the monk. If one piece of information had already been 
presented, it was more likely to be described first. For example, if the monk had been 
presented already but not the book, the participant was more likely to phrase the description 
differently, as A pirate gave the monk a book. This assignment of priority to given 
information is generally appropriate, given that the speaker and listener (or writer and 
reader) share the same given information. In this case, though, Slevc shows that the 
tendency to describe given information first was diminished when the speaking participant 
was under a working memory load. In a didactic situation such as giving a lecture, it thus 
seems plausible that the memory load inherent in the situation (remembering and planning 
what one wants to say in the coming segments of a lecture) may cause the lecturer 
sometimes to use awkward grammatical structure. Moreover, as mentioned above, learning 
to speak or write well requires that one bear in mind possible difference between what one 
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knows as the speaker (or writer) and what the listener (or reader) knows at key moments. 
For example, if one says, “Marconi was the inventor of the modern radio,” then, by the time 
the full topic of the sentence is known, the name is most likely no longer in the listener’s or 
student’s working memory. If, however, one says, “The modern radio was invented by a 
man named Marconi,” the context is set up first, making it easier to retain the name. Bearing 
in mind what the listener or reader knows and does not yet know is likely to be important 
both for educators in their own speaking and writing, and also in order to teach students how 
to speak and write effectively.
Working Memory Training
A much more controversial approach is to use training regimens to improve working 
memory, thereby improving performance on the educational learning tasks that require 
working memory (e.g., Klingberg, 2010). It is controversial partly because many people 
have spent a great deal of money purchasing such training programs before the scientific 
community has reached an agreement about the efficacy of such programs.
Doing working memory training studies is not easy. One needs a control group that is just as 
motivated by the task as the training group but without the working memory training aspect. 
The training task must be adaptive (with rewards for performance that continues to improve 
with training) and a non-adaptive control group does not adequately control arousal and 
motivation. Some task that is adaptive but involves long-term learning instead of working 
memory training may be adequate. Several large-scale reviews and studies have suggested 
that working memory training sometimes improves performance on the working memory 
task that is trained, but does not generalize to reasoning tasks that must rely on working 
memory (in adults, Redick et al., 2013, and Shipstead, Redick, & Engle, 2012; in children, 
Melby-Lervåg & Hulme, 2013). In somewhat of a contrast, other reviews suggest that the 
training of executive functions (inhibiting irrelevant information, updating working memory, 
controlling attention, etc.) does extend at least to tasks that use similar processes (Diamond 
& Lee, 2011) and some basically concur also for working memory (Chein & Morrison, 
2010). So there is an ongoing controversy, even among those who have written meta-
analyses and reviews of research.
One might ask how it is possible to improve working memory without having the effect of 
improving performance on other tasks that rely on working memory. This can happen 
because there are potentially two ways in which training can improve task performance. 
First, working memory training theoretically might increase the function of a basic process, 
much as a muscle can be strengthened through practice. (Or at least, individuals might learn 
that through diligent exertion of their attention and effort, they can do better.) That is 
presumably the route hoped for in training of working memory or executive function. 
Second, though, it is possible for working memory training to result in the discovery of a 
strategy for completing the task that is better than the strategy used initially. This can 
improve performance on the task being trained, but the experience and the strategy learned 
may well be irrelevant to performance on other educational tasks, even those that rely on 
working memory. This route might be expected if, as I suspect, participants typically look 
for a way to solve a problem that is not very attention-demanding, unless the payoff is high.
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If there is successful working memory training, another issue is whether training is capable 
of producing super-normal performance or whether it is mostly capable of rectifying 
deficiencies. By way of analogy, consider physical exercise. If a person is already walking 6 
miles a day, there might be little benefit to the heart of adding aerobic exercise. Similarly, if 
a person is already highly engaged in the environment and using attention control often and 
effectively during the day, there might be little benefit to the brain of adding working 
memory exercises. It remains quite conceivable, though, that such exercises are beneficial to 
certain individuals who are under-utilizing working memory. Nevertheless, as Diamond and 
Lee (2011) points out, there might be social or emotional reasons why this is the case and 
such factors would need to be addressed along with, or in some cases instead of, working 
memory training per se.
Working Memory and the Ultimate Goals of Education
What is the difference between learning and education? This is a question that has long been 
asked (for a history of the early period of educational psychology in the United States, for 
example, see Hall, 2003). Do children learn better when they are fed the information 
intensively, or allowed to explore the material? Should all children be expected to learn the 
same material, or should children be separated into different tracks and taught the 
information that is thought to help them the most in their own most likely future walks of 
life?
A fundamental difference between learning and education, many would agree, is that 
education should facilitate the acquisition of skills that will promote continued learning after 
the student leaves school. Of course, after the student leaves school, a major difference is 
that there is no teacher to decide what is to be learned, or how. Therefore, what seems to be 
most important, many would agree, is critical thinking skills. There is some sentiment that 
these skills can be trained (although for an opposing view see Tricot & Sweller, in press). 
For example, Halpern (1998 p. 449) suggests the following emphases for training critical 
thinking: “(a) a dispositional component to prepare learners for efforiful cognitive work, (b) 
instruction in the skills of critical thinking, (c) training in the structural aspects of problems 
and arguments to promote transcontextual transfer of critical-thinking skills, and (d) a 
metacognitive component that includes checking for accuracy and monitoring progress 
toward the goal.” Although I could find few well-controlled, peer-reviewed studies 
supporting the notion that it is possible to train critical thinking skills, optimistic evidence is 
beginning to roll in. For example, Shim and Walczak (2012) found that professors asking 
challenging questions resulted in more improvement in both subjective and objective 
measures of critical thinking. The objective measure required that students clarify, analyze, 
evaluate, and extend arguments, and increased 0.55 standardized units for every 1-unit 
increase in the rating of challenging questions asked. The gain was much stronger in 
students with high pretest scores in critical thinking. Halpern et al. (2012) have designed a 
computerized module to train critical thinking skills and obtained very encouraging initial 
results, with well-controlled training experiments in progress according to the report.
One can then ask, to what extent is the training of these higher-level skills dependent on the 
student’s working memory ability? The association is likely to be substantial, given the high 
Cowan Page 22
Educ Psychol Rev. Author manuscript; available in PMC 2015 June 01.
N
IH
-PA Author M
anuscript
N
IH
-PA Author M
anuscript
N
IH
-PA Author M
anuscript
correlation between working memory and reasoning ability even among normal adults 
(Kyllonen & Christal, 1990; Süβ, Oberauer, Wittmann, Wilhelm, & Schulze, 2002). There is 
the possibility that training working memory will in some way improve reasoning and vice 
versa, though most would agree at this point that the case has not yet been completely made 
(e.g., Jaeggi & Buschkuehl, 2013; Shipstead et al., 2012).
A current interest of mine is to understand how fallacies in reasoning might be related to 
fallacies in working memory performance. There appear to be some similarities between the 
two. One of the best-known reasoning fallacies is confirmation bias. In a key example 
(Wason & Shapiro, 1971) participants are given a set of cards laid on the table, each having 
a letter on one side and a number on the other, and are asked which cards must be turned 
over to assess a rule (e.g., If a card has a vowel on one side, it has an even number on the 
other side). Participants get that they must turn over the cards that can either confirm or 
disconfirm the rule (in the example, the cards showing vowels). They often fail to realize 
that they must also turn over cards that can only disconfirm the rule. In the example, one 
must turn over cards with odd numbers because the rule is disconfirmed if any of those cards 
have a vowel on the other side. In contrast, cards that can only confirm the rule are 
irrelevant. (One should not turn over cards with even numbers because the rule is technically 
not disconfirmed no matter whether there is a consonant or vowel on the other side.)
Chen and Cowan (in press) found performance on a working memory task that closely 
resembles confirmation bias. In one procedure, a spatial array of letters was presented on 
each trial, followed by a set of all of the letters at the bottom of the screen and a single 
location marked; the task was to select the correct letter for the marked location. In another 
procedure, the spatial array of letters was followed by a single letter from the array at the 
bottom of the screen and all of the locations marked; the task was to select the correct 
location for the presented letter. When working memory does not happen to contain the 
probed item, these procedures allow the use of disconfirming information. In the first task, 
for example, a participant might reason as follows: The letters were K, R, Q, and L. I know 
the locations of only R and L and neither of them match the probed location. Therefore, I 
know that the answer must be K or Q and I will guess randomly between them. That would 
be comparable to using disconfirming evidence. The pattern of data, however, did not 
appear to indicate that kind of process. Instead, participants answered correctly if they knew 
the probed item and otherwise guessed randomly among all of the other choices, without 
using the process of elimination. A mathematical model that assumed the latter process 
showed near-perfect convergence in capacity between the procedures described above and 
the usual change-detection procedure. If we instead assumed a mathematical model of 
performance in which disconfirming evidence was used through the process of elimination, 
there was no such convergence between the procedures.
So in reasoning and in working memory, processing tends to be inefficient, and it remains to 
be seen whether it can be meaningfully improved in terms of eliminating confirmation bias. 
Perhaps people with insufficient working memory or intelligence will always be stuck in 
such inefficient reasoning and there is nothing we can do. Arguing against that pessimistic 
view, however, is the recent finding (Stanovich, West, & Toplak, 2013) that the tendency to 
evaluate evidence more favorably when it agrees with one’s own view occurs across the 
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board and is not correlated with intelligence, and presumably therefore not correlated with 
working memory either. One might be able to train individuals to make the best use of the 
working memory they have without worrying about increasing the basic capacity of working 
memory, either by training critical thinking skills (Halpern, 1989) or by instilling expertise 
(Eriksson et al., 2004).
Conclusion
Working memory is the retention of a small amount of information in a readily accessible 
form, which facilitates planning, comprehension, reasoning, and problem-solving. When we 
talk of working memory, we often include not only the memory itself, but also the executive 
control skills that are used to manage information in working memory and the cognitive 
processing of information. Theoretically, there is still uncertainty about the basic limitations 
on working memory: are they limitations on concurrent holding capacity, mnemonic 
processing speed, duration of retention of information before it decays, or just the same sorts 
of interference properties that apply to long-term memory? While these basic issues are 
debated and empirical investigations continue, there is much greater agreement about what 
results are obtained in particular test circumstances; the results of working memory studies 
seem rather replicable, but small differences in method produce large differences in results, 
so that one cannot assume that a particular working memory finding is highly generalizable.
For learning and education, it is important to take into account the basic principles of 
cognitive development and cognitive psychology, adjusting the materials to the working 
memory capabilities of the learner. We are not yet at a point at which every task can be 
analyzed in advance in order to predict which tasks are doable with a particular working 
memory capability. It is possible, though, to monitor performance and keep in mind that 
failure could be due to working memory limitations, adjusting the presentation accordingly. 
Keeping in mind the limitations of working memory of listeners and readers could easily 
help to improve one’s lecturing and writing styles. I hope that awareness of working 
memory leads to a world in which we are all more tolerant of one another’s inability to 
understand perfectly, are more humble and less arrogant, and are better able to 
communicate, educate one another, and reach common ground.
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Figure 1. 
Schematic diagram of the arguments in the present article.
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